Cryptographic protocol for electronic auctions with extended requirements by Księżopolski, Bogdan & Kotulski, Zbigniew
Annales UMCS Informatica AI 2 (2004) 391-400 
Annales UMCS 
Informatica 
Lublin-Polonia  
Sectio AI 
http://www.annales.umcs.lublin.pl/ 
 
Cryptographic protocol for electronic auctions  
with extended requirements 
 
Bogdan Księżopolskia∗, Zbigniew Kotulskib
 
aInstitute of Physics, M. Curie-Skłodowska University, 
 pl. M. Curie-Skłodowskiej 1, 20-031 Lublin, Poland  
bInstitute of Fundamental Technological Research, Polish Academy of Sciences,  
Świętokrzyska, 21, 00-049 Warszawa, Poland  
 
Abstract  
In this paper we present a cryptographic protocol which is the realization of an electronic 
auction being the component of the e-government system. This cryptographic protocol fulfils all 
the functions of the classic auction and additionally, by use of cryptographic primitives, enhances 
the protection of information. The characteristic features of the protocol are: the incontrovertibility 
of participants and offers, data integrity, confidence of bids, anonymity of the winning bidder, 
public verification of the result of auction and confirmation of taking part in the auction.  
 
1. Introduction 
At present, traditional methods in public administration become insufficient, 
because they lead to the decision mechanisms that are time-consuming, 
expensive, inconvenient for customers as well as susceptible to abuse. The 
philosophy of modern state [1] founds that any information is being passed in a 
fast way. We mean: taking and transmitting the printings, quick correction of 
data, changes of legal controls, quicker treat of decision. Comparing classic 
computer solutions with traditional ones we can notice the considerable 
advantages from usage of the second variant. For example, classic execution 
auction carries behind the costs of notice of auction, mail of information, human 
costs (checking offers), filing, and moreover, it is then a time-consuming process 
as well as poorly resistant to abuse. In this new approach we can tell about low 
costs, whole process is being hold virtually, we save on filing of data, the whole 
process is being accelerated, it gathers transparency and applying cryptographic 
methods we can exclude each abuse, in cryptography considered as attacks.  
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In this paper we present the cryptographic protocol, which makes it possible 
to realize the auction in a virtual way and, additionally, assures the high 
protection of information taking the part in this process.  
 
2. Electronic auctions 
Now, we can notice the development of e-commerce, which is extensively 
manifested in internet shops, e-banks, electronic auctions as well as many other 
forms. To realize services mentioned above we use different cryptographic 
protocols, which take care about both correctness and safety of the information 
sent during the electronic communication process. Concerning e-auction, we 
should also pay attention to all mechanisms that must be used to make the 
auction possible.   
We distinguish several different types of electronic auctions (analogously to 
their traditional form). The most popular are: English, 1st Price Sealed – Bid, 
Vickrey, Dutch.  
The type English is the most widespread. It consists in auctioning the price 
for given goods. The price grows until it only one person taking part in auction, 
remains while others give up.  
Type 1st Price Sealed-Bid consists in declaring the price for given goods 
independently by every bidder. The person who declares the highest price wins 
goods and he is obliged to pay the price sugested by himself.  
The type Vickrey, alternatively called 2nd Price Sealed – Bid, is very similar 
to the previous model. The difference consists in wining the auction by the 
person, who declared the highest sum for given goods, but he pays the second 
highest in order.  
The type Dutch consists in starting the auction with the highest possible price 
and decreasing the requested price until some bidder agrees to pay it. This bidder 
wins the auction with the price by which the auction was stopped.  
Each introduced auction model possesses many cryptographic protocols 
realizing it, each is characterized different computation and communication 
complexity.  
To realize the auction with extended properties we can use the 1st Price 
Sealed – Bid auction model. 
 
3. The 1st Price Sealed - Bid auction model 
The type the 1st Price Sealed Bid is the model, on the basis of which many 
cryptographic protocols [2-4,6], presenting different degrees of complexity came 
into being. Thanks to it we get different level of information protection. 
Protocols possess individual requirements, solved by different techniques.  
In our case we should pay attention to some features. 
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3.1. The communication computational requirements 
Cryptographic protocols consist of different phases, during which all 
operations are executed. They can base on the communication steps, that is the 
transmission of information among participants of given protocols. Different 
activity is making calculations which need suitable computing power. Both 
methods are usually united, the essential difference between cryptographic 
protocols is the relation of executed calculations to the number of necessary 
connections between participants. 
 
3.2 The way of the price settlement 
Another essential element is the way of the price settlement. Some 
cryptographic protocols [2,7] possess the list of prices and the bidder can choose 
only a specific price value. Different [8] make it the choice of prices possible but 
it is usually one criterion offer which means taking into account the standard of 
prices only. 
 
3.3. Requirement in regard to the participants 
In electronic auctions main participants are: auctioneer or auctioneers as well 
as bidders. Tasks for the auctioneer are different depending on specific 
protocols, they generally control all phases of protocols. Bidders are the 
participants with the auction given offer. An important element is making it 
possible for bidders to participate in auction, in some protocols [2,7] not paying 
much attention to it. Another [8], foresee special subprotocol which is 
responsible for assigning authorization numbers. 
 
3.4. Practical techniques 
In current works to obtain a demanded level of information protection 
different techniques are used. In our case it is worth paying our attention to two 
of them.  
The first technique [2,6] bases its mechanism on the threshold scheme. In this 
method, we need several auctioneers, to whom bidders send their parts of offer. 
Main auctioneer links all parts and marks the final price without exposing 
individual offers to all bidders. Danger of this technique is inherent in possible 
collusions between auctioneers, which, in fact, can bring to earlier disclosure of 
component prices or not to disclosure of final offer.  
The second technique [3,4] excludes the possibility of collusions between 
auctioneers which is achieved thanks to the use of “trustworthy third person”. 
However, in this method the restriction can arouse the credibility for this “third 
person”.  
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4. Current e-auction and e-auction with extended requirements 
The creation of electronic form of auction is the aim of presented 
cryptographic protocol. Mechanisms applied in the current e-auction are very 
similar to the elements applied in the presented e-auction, I think here 
particularly about communication processes between individual sides. In spite of 
many similarities, pointed out earlier, our cryptographic protocol realizing e-
auctions can not be applied in its present form.  
The main difference consists in choosing a given offer, it does not only 
restrain to price, it is the choice of multicriteria, that is the composition of 
individual factors dependent on given cases.  
Another difference is the complexity of documents necessary for applying for 
participation in the auction. As discused earlier, in many protocols [2,7] 
attention is not paid to the opportunity to obtain the rights to take part in auction 
but rather only to bidder’s authorization. With realization of the presented e-
auction we have to pay a special attention to this element. 
With realization of the particular phases of protocol we use both above 
methods, that is: the threshold scheme and the third trustworthy person (TTP). 
Using those two methods is connected with complexity of requirements which 
the presented protocol has to satisfy. 
In the presented protocol, the confidence of bids is achieved by using the 
threshold scheme of dividing secret [5]. 
 
5. Description of the protocol 
5.1. Model 
The presented protocol of e-auction consists of four subprotocols: 
certification, notification of auction, notification of offer as well as choice of 
offer. In protocol there take part N bidders (O1, ....... ,ON), third trustworthy 
person that is GAP (main auction agency) as well as firm which wants to 
announce the auction.  
The first step of protocol is verification by GAP, the participants taking part 
in e-auction are the bidders ON as well as firm F which wants to announce the 
auction (the subprotocol of certification). The next step is notification to GAP 
the auction by verified firm F. GAP publishes the conditions of notified auction, 
giving all requirements notified by F (the  subprotocol of notification of 
auction). In the next step, a person wanting to take part in auction, after earlier 
verification, sends his offer to GAP ( the subprotocol of notification of offer). 
The last subprotocol is executed after elapsing of time for notification of offers, 
then firm F as well as bidders ON, send their parts of secret (needed to read 
offers) to GAP. After decoding them, they will be sent to firm F, where the 
winning offer will be chosen. In the same subprotocol, the firm F sends 
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information about the winning offer to GAP, then it will be given to (be 
generally known) public knowledge (the subprotocol of choice of offer).  
The communication between participants of protocol is safe. We achieve it 
thanks to using public key cryptography, where every participant of protocol 
possesses his private key (SK) as well as public key (PK). Those practical keys 
are not permanent, their validity ends with the validity of registration number, 
which is achieved  in subprotocol of certification.  
Offers sent by ON bidders are coded by the public key of a given auction. 
They can be read on the condition that we possess the private key, which in the 
subprotocol of notification of auction becomes divided into parts with the help 
of the suitable safe threshold scheme of division of secret. In the protocol we 
also use the random numbers generator (KG). We use it to create the 
identification number of participants of auction as well as the numbers of 
auctions. 
Auction ends when a given time passes. To determine it the time stamp (T) is 
used. 
 
5.2. Proprieties of the protocol 
The presented cryptographic protocol is characterized by the following 
features: 
– Incontrovertibility of participants: Only certificated persons can announce 
e-auction. Only entitled persons can make auction’s offers.  
– Integrity of data: Both the content of sent offers as well as the final results 
of e-auction cannot be modified. 
– The incontrovertibility of offers: Bidder who won e-auction can not deny 
the content of his offer as well as the fact of making this offer. 
– Confidence of bids: Nobody can establish the content of the sent offers 
before the end of e-auction. 
– Anonymity of the winning bidder: The bidder who won the auction is not 
disclosed publicly. 
– Public verification: Everyone can check, which offer won e-auction. 
Participants of e-auction can check if their offers were taken into 
consideration. 
 
6. Realization of the protocol 
6.1. The certification subprotocol  
The opportunity of participation in e-auction has to be preceded by obtaining 
suitable authorizations.  
A person who applies for certificate, that is a firm wanting to announce 
auction or bidder, should possess appropriate documents Dc as well as private 
key SKCCA achieved from one of the earlier indicated centres of 
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authorization(CA). He signs the documents mentioned above digitally by using 
SKCCA and then code with help of public key PKGAP and later sends it to GAP. 
GAP decodes documents and verifies them. After positive verification, it 
generates them with the help of the generator of random numbers (KG), unique 
registration number for a given person NRC. The registration number is 
important for a definite time, so that the time stamp of registration number TNRC 
is generated. GAP generates also private key (SKC) and public (PKC) keys for a 
given subject, which will be used in the next subprotocol. Validity of these keys 
ends along with crossing the time shown by TNRC. It signs digitally the generated 
data, it codes with the help of the public key C and then sends it to C.  
 
Table 1. Graph of the certification subprotocol 
 
               
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
          C                 GAP 
    Input =(DC,SKCCA) 
 
 
                         1.  If DC = TRUE 
   2. KG        NRC,TNRC,(SKC,PKC) 
 
 
 
2. {{NRC, TNRC,(SKC,PKC) }SKGAP}PKC
1. {{DC}SKC}PKGAP
 
6.2. The auction notification subprotocol  
The person certified subprotocol can be notified for the auction.  
Such a person, indicated as F, should possess the registration number NRF, his 
time stamp TNRF, private key SKF as well as conditions of notified auction WPF . 
F generates his individual number NF with the help of the generator of random 
numbers (KG). 
In the first step, F sends to GAP, signed digitally (SKF) as well as coded 
(PKGAP) the following information: his registration number (NRF), his time 
stamp (TNRF), the conditions of auction (WPF) as well as his individual number 
(NF).  
The main auction agency (GAP) verifies the registration number F (NRF) as 
well as validity of his time gauge. After positive authorization GAP generates 
the individual number of auction (NP) as well as a few keys for concrete auction 
(SKP,PKP). The private key of auction (SKP) is divided by the use of the 
threshold scheme of dividing secret. Secret is divided into three parts, designed 
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for F( SKP(F)), for GAP (SKP(GAP)) as well as bidders in auction (SKP(OF)). Each 
part is necessary to reproduce the private key (SKP).  
GAP sends digitally the signed (SKGAP) as well as the coded (PKF)) – the part 
of secret designed for F (SKP(F)). 
GAP publishes, for example on WWW page, the number of auction (NP), 
conditions (WPF) as well as its public key (PKP). 
 
Table 2. Graph of the auction notification subprotocol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. {{SKP(F) } SKGAP}PKF 2. NP, WPF, PKP 
     F                                              GAP                                                     WWW 
    Input =(NRF,SKF,TNRF ,WPF ) 
   KG       NF
 
 
                   
                     1.  If (NRF, TNRF) = TRUE 
                                            2. KG        NP, (SKP,PKP) 
     3. SKP = SKP(F) +   SKP(GAP) + SKP(OF)
1. {{NRF, WPF, NF, TNRF}SKF}PKGAP
6.3. The offer notification subprotocol  
After the auction is notified and published, the interested parties can notify 
their offers. A bidder wanting to take part in auction should possess the obtained 
earlier registration number (NRO1), private key (SKO1) as well as his offer 
(OFO1). Then a bidder O1, generates his individual number (NO1) and he marks 
his offer by the time stamp (TOF1).  
      
Table 3. Graph of the offer notification subprotocol      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            GAP                                                                                               O1   
Input = (NRO1,OFO1,SKO1) 
1. KG      NO1,TOF1 
          
 
 
if (NP, NRO1, TOF1) = TRUE 
1. WO1 = OK 
 
    3. {{WO1}SKGAP}PKO1
1. {{NP, NO1, NRO1, TOF1}SKO1}PKGAP, {{OFO}SKO1}PKP  
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The next step consists in sending to GAP the digitally signed (SKO1) as well 
as the coded (PKGAP) following information: NP, NO, NRO, TO. The offer (OFO1) 
is also digitally signed (SKO1) but it is coded by use of public key of given 
auction (PKP), then it is sent to GAP.  
If the sent data are correct, then GAP sends O1, the confirmation of the 
notification of offer (WO1). Confirmation is digitally signed by GAP (SKGAP) as 
well as coded (PKO1). 
 
6.4. The offer choice subprotocol  
The last subprotocol is executed after the time designed for making offers 
passes. This time is published with different conditions of auction (WPF). 
Knowing the number of bidders who sent their offers (N) GAP it divides the 
earlier split part of main secret of auction (SKP(OF)) into N of smaller parts. He 
uses the safe threshold scheme of dividing secret about profile (2,N). The 
created parts are signed digitally (SKO1), coded (PKO1) and sent to all bidders 
ON.  
 
Table 4. Graph of the offer choice subprotocol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. NO, NON
4. {{NRO1, NRF, NON, NF, NP}SKF}PKGAP
3. {{{OFN}SKON}SKGAP}PKF
2. {{SKP(F)}SKF}PKGAP  2. {{SKP(O1)}SKO1 }PKGAP  
  F                            GAP                                       O1                             WWW 
                              1. SKP(ON) = (SKP(OF)  / N) 
 1. {{SKP(O1) }SKGAP}PKO1  
 
In the next step, the firm F as well as the bidders ON send digitally their 
signed and coded parts of secret to GAP, where they are assembled in the main 
secret of the auction (SKP). Having the whole secret of the given auction, GAP 
can decode all sent offers (OFN). After this action he sends all offers digitally 
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 20:50:51
UM
CS
 Cryptographic protocol for electronic auctions … 399 
signed by bidders to the firm F, which announces the auction. All offers are 
earlier undersigned digitally (SKGAP) as well as coded (PKF).  
After having received offers the firm F chooses the best offer and sends the 
results to GAP in order to notify the winner. The information is the following: 
the bidder who won auction registration number (NRO1), his registration number 
(NRF), all bidders whose offers were taken into account with their individual 
numbers (NON), his individual number (NF) as well as the number of auction 
(NP). The information is digitally signed (SKF) as well as coded (PKGAP). 
After having received information GAP publishes the individual number 
(NO1) of the bidder whose offer won. The individual numbers of the bidders 
whose offers considered are given to public knowledge (NON). 
 
7. Security of the protocol 
In this part of work, we will try to prove that the foundation shown in the 
earlier part of work were fulfilled.  
Participants’ incontrovertibility. The subprotocol of certification is 
responsible for main  participants’ verifications. GAP as the third trustworthy 
person checks the required documents and assigns the right to notify the own 
auction or the right of participation in the auction. Registration assigning the 
individual number is necessary in order to take part in the remaining 
subprotocols. 
Data integrity. The offers sent by bidders are digitally signed with the help 
of private keys received by every bidder after the positive verification in 
subprotocol of certification. The results of auction, are also signed digitally by 
the firm which announced the auction. It also possesses the private key received 
in the subprotocol of certification. 
Confidence of the bids. The bidder can not deny the content of his offer 
because before it will be coded with the help of the auction public key, it has to 
be signed digitally by him. The fact of making the offer by bidder is noted down 
by GAP which archives every correct offer.  
Anonymity of the offers. The offers sent by bidders are coded by the use of 
auction public key. The private key of auction is divided with the use of safe 
threshold scheme of dividing secret into three parts of which each is necessary 
for contents of the whole secret. One part stays in GAP, the second is sent to the 
firm F which announces auction and the third one is for the bidders taking part in 
the auction. The third part in the subprotocol of offer choice, is divided 
according to the scheme (2,n) that is the fractionise secret for n parts but only 
two are necessary for the second composition of secret. Scheme (2,n) is chosen 
because we need minimum two offers for the auction to be important. 
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Winning bidder’s anonymity. After choosing the winning offer only 
bidder’s individual number is passed to public knowledge. This number shows 
the winning bidder.  
Public verification. After finding the winner of e-auction, all bidders’ 
individual numbers and the distinction number which won the auction are 
published. Every participant can check if his number is on the list which is 
equivalent to the fact of taking his offer under consideration. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The presented cryptographic e-auction protocol can be used in any situation 
where requirements for its realization are very restrictive and complicated. The 
complexity can lie both in criteria of notified auctions and processes of the 
authentication of the participants.  
The protocol was designed to give possibility of computer application.   
In future it is worth focusing on the possibility of replacing the third 
trustworthy person in the protocol by some additional calculations, which 
enhance the burden of a given system but allow to reduce the communication  
among the parts of auction considerably. 
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